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FOREWORD
A Pivotal Moment for Election Law
Joshua A. Douglas'
The 2016 election cycle may go down as the most bizarre-and tumultuous-in
recent memory. There were surprises, twists, and turns as both Republicans and
Democrats whittled down their fields to choose their presidential nominees,
culminating in a hard-fought general election battle.
A significant part of the debate involved an outsized personality. Yes, one man
loomed large over it all: Justice Antonin Scalia.
Indeed, while Donald Trump may have garnered the most headlines, Justice
Scalia's sudden death on February 13, 2016,2 remained a less discussed, yet vitally
important, aspect of the presidential campaign. The politics of choosing his
replacement were obvious: Democrats wanted President Obama or Hillary Clinton
to select Justice Scalia's successor, while Senate Republicans stalled in the hope that
a Republican candidate would win the presidency and name a conservative to the
Court. On March 16, 2016, President Obama nominated Judge Merrick Garland
to the Supreme Court, but the Senate refused to hold a hearing or vote on his
nomination.3 Trump's victory in the 2016 election means that the Republicans'
gamble on refusing to consider Judge Garland paid off and that Trump will choose
the next Supreme Court Justice once he takes office.
If Hillary Clinton had won the presidential election, 2016 would have
represented a major turning point in various areas, including election law. Many
important election law cases of the past decade have been 5-4 decisions, with
'Robert G. Lawson & William H. Fortune Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky
College of Law. Thanks to Mike Pitts and Franita Tolson for their helpful comments and to the
students of the Kentucky LawJournal for their tireless efforts in putting on this Symposium.
2 Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html.
'See Juliet Eilperin & Mike DeBonis, President Obama Nominates Merrick Garland to the
Supreme Court, WASH. POST (Mar. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/president-obama-to-nominate-merrick-garland-to-the-supreme-court-sources-
say/2016/03/16/3bc9Obc8-eb7c-1le5-a6f3-21ccdbc5f74e story.htnl.
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Justice Scalia joining the conservatives in the majority.4 From redistricting to the
Voting Rights Act to campaign finance to election administration, a new Justice
could tip the balance on these issues and alter the doctrine. That possibility seemed
quite likely with most polls projecting a Hillary Clinton win, but with Donald
Trump now poised to take the White House, it is more probable that his
appointee-who Trump has said will be someone with views similar to Justice
Scalia's-will maintain the conservative majority on these issues.' Yet without
knowing whom precisely Trump will nominate, the potential still exists that some
of this doctrine could change with a new Justice. Or, on the other end of the
spectrum, a Trump appointee could solidify or even extend conservative election
law jurisprudence for years to come. Either way, the future of election law will
depend significantly on the new Supreme Court Justice.
The timing could not have been better, then, for the Kentucky Law Journal to
host a symposium on election law.6 Not only does this Issue come out just after the
presidential election, but it also contains significant election law scholarship that
could impact the Court post-Scalia. With a new Justice, some of the doctrinal
underpinnings of election law are open to change; the articles in this Symposium
Issue will be at the forefront of these developments.
In this brief Foreword to the Symposium Issue, I chronicle the importance of
Justice Scalia's death to election law jurisprudence and highlight the articles in this
Issue that will shape the debate in the coming years. Part I looks at how a
replacement for Justice Scalia could change, solidify, or extend various aspects of
' See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014) (plurality opinion); Shelby Cty. v. Holder,
133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); League of United Latin Am.
Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (plurality
opinion).
' Robert Barnes, Trump's victory has enormous consequences for the Supreme Court, WASH.
POST (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts-law/trumps-victory-has-
enormous-consequences-for-the-supreme-court/2016/11/09/lea52b3e-a671-1le6-ba59-
a7d93165c6d4_story.html.
' The Kentucky Law Journal initially planned its Symposium for January 22, 2016, but Winter
Storm Jonas, which hit Kentucky with over a foot of snow, required a last-minute postponement. The
Journal rescheduled the Symposium for March 25, 2016, with an additional panel on Ned Foley's book,
Ballot Battles: The History ofDisputed Elections in the United States, on April 1, 2016.
The panelists at the Kentucky Law Journal Symposium included Professors Atiba Ellis, Luis
Fuentes-Rohwer, Mike Gilbert, Rebecca Green, Steve Huefier, Michael Morley, Mike Pitts, Lori
Ringhand, Michael Solimine, Nick Stephanopoulos, Dan Tokaji, and Franita Tolson; and four
Kentucky lawyers who practice election law, former Kentucky Secretary of State Trey Grayson, Eric
Lycan, Jennifer Moore, and Scott White. Kentucky Secretary of State Alison Lundergan Grimes gave
the keynote address. At lunch, Gregory Pettit and George Mills recounted the 1973 disputed mayoral
election in Lexington, Ky., deemed "The Spider Election." Professor Gilda Daniels initially planned to
speak at the January 22 event, but could not make the rescheduled date; she still, however, provided a
valuable contribution in an article for this Issue. Finally, Professor Ned Foley and two University of
Kentucky historians, Professors Tracy Campbell and Mark Summers, discussed Professor Foley's book
Ballot Ballots on April 1, a week after the main event.
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election law doctrine. 7 Part II then summarizes the seven articles in this
Symposium Issue, explaining how fresh eyes on the Court could potentially give
these proposals a boost.' This is a pivotal moment for election law. The Kentucky
Law Journal articles in this Symposium Issue will lead the way.
I. THE IMPACT OF A NEW JUSTICE ON ELECTION LAW
Election law cases have been among the most contentious disputes the Supreme
Court has considered over the past several years. The Court has split, often 5-4, on
important election law issues such as redistricting, the Voting Rights Act,
campaign finance, and election administration. Justice Scalia typically voted with
the conservative bloc. That conservative majority made it difficult to bring a
successful challenge to a partisan gerrymander,9 gutted a major provision of the
Voting Rights Act, ° struck down almost every campaign finance regulation it
encountered," and largely deferred to states in their Election Day processes.2
Much of that doctrine and its theoretical foundations could shift with a new
Justice. The likelihood of changed election law jurisprudence would have been
greater had Judge Garland made it through the Senate confirmation process or had
Hillary Clinton won the presidency-demonstrating the sheer importance of the
2016 election. But even a Trump-appointed Justice will face these issues and could
alter-in either direction-how the Court considers them.
First, a new Justice could open the door for litigants to challenge a redistricting
plan as an unlawful partisan gerrymander-a legal claim that Justice Scalia
vehemently opposed. Justice Scalia wrote the plurality opinion in Vieth v. Jubelirer,
'I wrote a blog post with some initial thoughts on the importance of Justice Scalia's death to
election law a day after he passed away. See Josh Douglas, Justice Scalia and Election Law,
PRAWFSBLAWG (Feb. 14, 2016, 12:46 PM),
http://prawfsbawg.blogs.com/prawfsblawg/2016/02/ustice-scalia-and-election-law.htm]. That blog
post was republished on Newsweek's website. See Josh Douglas, Opinion, How a New Justice Could
Change Our Elections, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 18, 2016, 11:16 AM), http://www.newsweek.com/how-
new-justice-could-change-our-elections-428140.
' My focus in this Foreword is on how Justice Scalia's death opened the possibility of any new
Justice to alter election law jurisprudence. Admittedly, however, either Judge Garland or a Hillary
Clinton appointee likely would have presented a better chance at doctrinal reform than anyone Donald
Trump will select.
'See LULAC, 548 U.S. 399; Vieth, 541 U.S. 267.
15 See Shelby Cty., 133 S. Ct. 2612.
11 See, e.g., McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310
(2010). The first campaign finance rule that the Roberts Court upheld was a Florida law that regulated
judicial candidates. See Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 (2015). ChiefJustice Roberts joined
the traditional "liberals" to uphold the law; Justice Scalia wrote a dissent. Id. at 1662, 1675.
12 See Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013); Crawford v. Marion Cty.
Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008); see also Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusting States to Run Elections,
92 WASH. U. L. REv. 553, 553 (2015) (explaining that "the Court has been unjustifiably deferring to
state laws regarding election administration, thereby giving states tremendous power to regulate
elections").
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a 2004 case from Pennsylvania in which he said that there are no manageable
standards available to separate "good" politics from "bad" in the redistricting
context.3 That is, he ruled that claims asserting unlawful political gerrymandering
are nonjusticiable.14 Although three other Justices joined Justice Scalia's opinion,"
Justice Kennedy refused to do so because he did not want to foreclose any
possibility of a future standard emerging, perhaps under the First Amendment
right to association.6 Still, Justice Kennedy agreed that no standard had yet evolved
that made sense.'7 Combining the plurality with Justice Kennedy's opinion
concurring in the judgment, the vote was 5-4 that no judicially manageable
standards existed. The four dissenters-Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer-all suggested judicial tests they believed would root out the worst partisan
abuses in redistricting.'8 The votes were largely the same two years later in League
of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry (LULAC). In that case, the Court
again split 5-4 in rejecting a proposed standard for invalidating partisan
gerrymanders that a legislature passes in the middle of a decade, when states are
under no obligation to redistrict.'9
Replacing Justice Scalia with a jurist who would give substantive force to a
cause of action for partisan gerrymandering could alter this doctrine. If Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan join Justices Ginsburg and Breyer in adopting a standard
(which seems quite likely), then a new Justice would create a majority on the Court
that is opposite from the majority in Vieth and LULAC. This majority could
sanction a rule that allows courts to root out egregious partisan gerrymandering,
even without Justice Kennedy's vote."° A new Justice thus might allow courts to
provide a remedy when partisanship drives map-drawing decisions too much.
Indeed, ideology need not dictate one's views on the justiciability of a partisan
13 See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 281, 299.
14 See id. at 281.
,s See id. at 270.
16 Id. at 306, 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) ("I would not foreclose all possibility of
judicial relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to correct an established violation of the
Constitution in some redistricting cases.").
17 See id. at 307-08.
" See id. at 318, 335 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 346 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg,
J.); id. at 355 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
"9 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry (LULAC), 548 U.S. 399, 423 (2006)
(plurality opinion) (rejecting claim that the very fact of a mid-decade redistricting suggests an unlawful
partisan gerrymander).
2 The Court will likely hear such a challenge soon after a new Justice takes his or her seat, as a
three-judge district court in Wisconsin threw out the state's map as an unlawful partisan gerrymander
under a newly-formulated "efficiency gap" standard. See Whitford v. Gill, No. 15-cv-421, 2016 WL
6837229 (W.D. Wisc. Nov. 21, 2016) (three-judge court).
In addition, at least one state court has given judicial force to its state constitutional mandate
forbidding partisan gerrymanders, invalidating a state legislative map because the legislature considered
politics too much when drawing it. See In re Senate Joint Resolution of Legislative Apportionment
1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 638, 683 (Fla. 2012).
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gerrymandering claim given that both sides do it when in power, so even a Trump
appointee may be sympathetic to these suits.
Second, a new Justice could impact how the Court considers the
constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act ("VRA"). In 2013, a 5-4 majority of the
Court-with Justice Scalia joining the other conservatives-rendered ormant a
major portion of the VRA, Section 5, by invalidating the coverage formula of the
preclearance mechanism.21 Under the preclearance rule of Section 5, certain
"covered jurisdictions" with a history of racial discrimination were required to
obtain preapproval, or "preclearance," from the Department of Justice or a three-
judge federal district court before making any changes to their voting processes.
22
The Court, however, struck down the formula that determined which jurisdictions
were "covered" and thereby had to comply with the Section 5 preclearance
requirement.23 Yet it did not invalidate Section 5 itself. The majority opinion
instead implied, in dicta, that it might strike down Section 5 in a future case given
the "substantial federalism costs" the provision imposes. 24 Justice Thomas,
concurring, argued that the Court should have gone further and ruled Section 5
unconstitutional.2 1 Prior to Justice Scalia's death, the writing was on the wall that,
if Congress passed a new coverage formula, or if the federal government
successfuly places a jurisdiction under the preclearance requirement through
Section 3 of the VRA (something it has considered for North Carolina and Texas
given the racially discriminatory voting laws in those states),26 then the whole
preclearance mechanism might be in jeopardy.27 In addition, scholars and voting
rights advocates have harbored significant concerns that a conservative majority
might invalidate Section 2 of the VRA, which prohibits discrimination in voting
nationwide, as going beyond Congress's authority.
28
21 See Shelby Cty. v, Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013).
22 Id. at 2619-20.
2' Id. at 2631.
24 Id. at 2621, 2627.
2 Id. at 2631 (Thomas, J., concurring).
26 See Adam Liptak & Charlie Savage, U.S. Asks Court to Limit Texas on Ballot Rules, N.Y.
TiMES (July 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/26/us/holder-wants-texas-to-dear-voting-
changes-with-the-us.html.
7 See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State's Rights, Last Rites, and Voting
Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481, 486 (2014) (noting that "Shelby County portends a realignment in
voting rights law and policy"); Franita Tolson, The Constitutional Structure of Voting Rights
Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 393 (2014) (explaining that "at least some of the justices are
convinced that the decline in overt discrimination makes the Act's intrusion on state sovereignty
unprecedented and unwarranted").
' See Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M. Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2143, 2158 (2015) (noting that Shelby County
provided an "accelerant" to the "[1]ooming [t]hreats to Section 2"); Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making
Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and Common Law Statutes, 160 U.
PA. L. REV. 377, 399 (2012). Cf Franita Tolson, What is Abridgment?: A Critique of Two Section
Twos, 67 ALA. L. REV. 433, 438 (2015) (arguing that Section 2 of the VRA is constitutional because
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Had Hillary Clinton won the presidential election, then those concerns likely
would have disappeared because her nominee could have created a new majority
that would uphold the VRA. Now, with Donald Trump appointing Justice Scalia's
successor, the VRA is still in a precarious place, hanging on by a thread. Section 2
may be in serious jeopardy.29 Thus, the 2016 election may have a profound impact
on the most powerful voting rights legislation of the past fifty years by solidifying
the conservative bloc's effort to dismantle it, piece by piece. Supporters of the VRA
have to hope that the new Justice will depart from Justice Scalia's views regarding
the Act.
Third, the 2016 election could have begun a reversal in another major election
law battle: campaign finance. Of course, Citizens United v. FEC is the big case.3"
The most important aspect of that case, however, was not the Court's holding that
corporations and unions have a First Amendment right to use their general treasury
money to run independent ads.3 Instead, the doctrinal significance was the
majority's definition of corruption. In Buckley v. Valco, the first major campaign
finance decision, the Court said that Congress may regulate money in politics to
root out corruption or its appearance.32 The Court has vacillated, however, on the
definition of "corruption." At times, the Court has defined it broadly to include
ingratiation and access.33 But in Citizens United, the majority adopted a narrow
definition of corruption as including only direct quid pro quo arrangements.34 A
narrow definition limits significantly the kinds of regulations Congress or states
may enact.35 The four Justices in dissent would have employed a much broader
understanding of corruption, thereby allowing Congress and the states to regulate
the various ways that money can have a corrupting influence on our elections.36 The
arguments played themselves out predictably four years later in McCutcheon v.
FEC, in which the five-Justice conservative majority invalidated "aggregate"
contribution limits, or the total amount of money an individual may give to all
campaigns during an election cycle.37 The next regulation to fall may be the
"Congress does not have to amass a record of purposeful racial discrimination or action by the state in
order to enact legislation that ensures broad enfranchisement in state and federal elections").
29 A new Justice might also shore up the Section 5 framework, but the validity of that provision is
unlikely to reach the Court unless Congress responds to Shelby County by passing a new coverage
formula-which seems quite unlikely in today's political environment.
o Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
3, Id. at 365.
32 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26-29 (1976).
33 McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 153-54 (2003).
34 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 359-60.
35 The Court applied Citizens United to the states in American Tradition Partnership, another 5-4
decision. Am. Tradition P'ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490, 2491 (2012) (per curiam); see also id.
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
36 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 447-48 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Stevens wrote the dissent, which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor joined. Id. at 393.
31 McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014).
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individual contribution limit,3" that is, the total amount an individual can give to
one federal candidate (set at $2,700 for 2016)."
A new Justice could either change that doctrine or entrench it for years to come.
In particular, a Hillary Clinton nominee probably would have created a new 5-4
majority that would have re-adopted a broader definition of corruption, upheld
contribution limitations, and allowed further regulation of the flow of money in
politics. As Justice Stevens poignantly suggested at the end of his Citizens United
dissent, "[w]hile American democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of this
Court would have thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in
politics."' The election could have changed that majority, leading the Court to
overrule Citizens United and expand the definition of corruption to allow greater
regulation of campaign finance more generally.4" A Trump appointee, however, is
more likely to fall in line with the conservative wing of the Court, thus solidifying
or extending stringent campaign finance doctrine that forbids most regulation of
money in politics. In short, although we do not yet know who Trump will appoint
or how that person will rule, a presidential election that could have been a turning
point in campaign finance law instead will probably result in the same (or greater).
anti-regulation jurisprudence for years to come.
Finally, a new majority on the Court could apply greater judicial scrutiny to
state election processes. Under current doctrine, the Court is too deferential to
states in their election administration, producing decisions that generally allow
politicians to enact voting rules that will help their electoral chances.42 The Court
" See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr., et al., Contribution Limits After McCutcheon v. FEC, 49 VAL. U. L.
REV. 361, 389 (2015) (advocating that "[b]ecause of McCutcheon, key circuit court decisions that
previously upheld limits on direct contributions to candidates are no longer legally sound"); Richard
Briffault, The Uncertain Future of the Corporate Contribution Ban, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. 397, 398-99
(2015) ("[A]ssuming the Court continues to recognize the constitutional validity of contribution limits
and to apply a less strict standard of review to contribution restrictions than to expenditure limits-
admittedly a big 'if-the ban on corporate donations ought to pass constitutional muster."); Richard L.
Hasen, Super PAC Contributions, Corruption, and the Proxy War over Coordination, 9 DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 15 (2014) ("Taken as a whole, McCutcheon calls the constitutionality of all
contribution limits into question.").
39 Contribution Limits for 2015-2016 Federal Elections, FEC,
http://www.fec.gov/info/contriblimitschart1516.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2016).
o Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 479 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
41 For instance, the Court could allow Congress and the states to regulate money under an equality
interest. See RICHARD L. HASEN, PLUTOCRATS UNITED: CAMPAIGN MONEY, THE SUPREME
COURT, AND THE DISTORTION OF AMERICAN ELECTIONS 11 (2016). By adopting an equality
rationale, a new Justice could join a new majority in overturning two recent cases, Arizona Free
Enterprise and Davis v. FEC, which had invalidated "triggers" that kicked in based on the spending of
an opponent. Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2818, 2828
(2011); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738-40 (2008). Overruling these cases could have the effect of
making it easier to level the playing field between candidates, as well as help public financing systems
remain viable (because a state could set the amount of public financing that a candidate receives based
on the amount of money that a privately financed candidate is spending in the race).
42 See Douglas, supra note 12, at 555-56. Of course, the one major exception to this deferential
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uses a balancing test to evaluate laws that impact the constitutional right to vote.4"
For instance, in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, the Court refused to
invalidate Indiana's voter ID law because a majority of Justices found that the
plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence of the burdens the law would
impose on voters, while the state had an important interest in ensuring "election
integrity."' But the state merely asserted a generalized interest in election integrity
and safeguarding voter confidence; the Court did not press the state for specific
evidence of the existence of in-person impersonation that the voter ID law would
root out.4" The result was a 6-3 decision, with Justice Stevens joining the more
conservative Justices, to uphold the law. 6 Yet Justice Stevens's opinion for the
plurality was narrower than Justice Scalia's opinion concurring in the judgment.
Justice Stevens left the door open to future as-applied challenges with better
evidence, while Justice Scalia would have largely foreclosed any challenges to a
voter ID requirement.47 The dissents in Crawford would have required the state to
justify its burden on the right to vote with more specificity given that the law
imposed a disproportionate harm on voters without a qualifying ID. 4
Justice Kagan has replaced Justice Stevens, and given her overall jurisprudence,
it is highly likely that she would agree with the dissenters in Crawford.49 This
means that the new Justice who takes Justice Scalia's seat could create a 5-4
majority that is skeptical of voter ID laws or other voting rules passed primarily for
partisan gain. This issue may come to the Court quite soon, as litigation is ongoing
in both North Carolina and Texas over their new voter ID requirements.5 0 In
approach was Bush v. Gore, in which the conservative majority (which included Justice Scalia) did not
defer to Florida's processes in counting ballots. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 107-08 (2000) (plurality
opinion).
3 Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432-34 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789
(1983) (discussing the balancing test applied to state election laws, which weighs the character and
magnitude of the plaintiffs asserted injury against the state's asserted interests and justifications).
"Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 195-96, 200, 202 (2008) (plurality
opinion); see also id. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
s Id. at 194 ("The record contains no evidence of any such fraud actually occurring in Indiana at
any time in its history.").
'Justice Stevens wrote the Court's plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment, writing a separate opinion in which Justices Thomas
and Alito joined. Id. at 184, 204. Justice Souter wrote a dissent, which Justice Ginsburg joined. Id. at
209. Justice Breyer also wrote a dissent. Id. at 237.
4 Compare id. at 202 (plurality opinion), with id. at 205 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
See id. at 209, 224 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.); id. at 237 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
" Given her more liberal ideology, it is also likely that Justice Sotomayor would agree on this issue
with her predecessor, Justice Souter.
" See N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, Nos. 16-1468, 16-1469, 16-1474, 16-
1529, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13797, at *70-71, 79-80 (4th Cir. July 29, 2016) (invalidating North
Carolina election laws, including voter ID requirement, as the product of intentional racial
discrimination); Veasey v. Abbott, No. 14-41127, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 13255, at *141 (5th Cir. July
20, 2016) (striking down applications of Texas's voting photo identification requirement).
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particular, the Court may face a constitutional challenge to these states' strict voter
ID laws with better evidence of the burdens the laws impose on voters or a claim
that the laws discriminate against minority voters and therefore violate Section 2 of
the VRA. More broadly, a new five-Justice bloc could force states to justify their
election regulations with greater specificity, giving teeth to the state interest prong
of the constitutional analysis. Greater judicial scrutiny on state election
administration laws would improve our democratic processes, as legislative
majorities would enjoy less leeway to enact regulations with the goal of achieving
partisan advantage. Renewed attention to a state's justifications for its election laws
also would represent a triumph for a robust understanding of the constitutional
right to vote. Again, we do not yet know how a Trump appointee will rule on these
issues, and perhaps it is too much to hope that he or she will significantly alter the
Court's approach to voting rights. But the opportunity is there anytime there is a
new Justice, especially if that person will consider the issues independently and
with an open mind. The evidence demonstrates that claims of voter fraud are
overblown and that states impose too many restrictions on voters for no good
reason. A new Justice who understands these facts should force states to justify
their laws with greater specificity.
In sum, election law is at a crossroads. Having a new Justice on the Court could
impact the doctrine in all aspects of the field, particularly given the close split in
many of these cases. As of the publication of this Symposium Issue, we do not yet
know who Donald Trump will appoint once he takes the oath of office. But this
much is certain: had Hillary Clinton won, the 2016 presidential election would
have been a major turning point in the field. With Donald Trump's victory, the
prospect for change is dimmer, but doctrinal developments are still possible
depending on who ultimately joins the Court.
II. SCHOLARLY COMMENTARY ON ELECTION LAW DURING A SUPREME
COURT VACANCY
This Symposium Issue of the Kentucky Law Journal contains important legal
scholarship on election law amidst a Supreme Court vacancy. The scholars who
contributed to this Issue began writing their articles before Justice Scalia died, so
they did not necessarily craft their proposals with a Supreme Court opening in
mind. That said, the Court could be more likely to consider their suggestions with
a new Justice joining the bench.
The idea that probably will have the most traction in a newly constituted
Supreme Court is Professor Luis Fuentes-Rohwer's push for the Court to stem the
tide of partisan gerrymandering.51 Professor Fuentes-Rohwer points to Justice
Kennedy's concern about the possible "floodgates" of litigation as the main reason
"' See Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Who's Afraid of the Hated Poltical Gerrymander, 104 KY. LJ. 561
(2016).
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for the Court's reticence to these claims.52 But, as he notes, the Court faced this
same concern after Baker v. Carr, when it opened the judiciary to redistricting
claims in general, and yet after Baker, "the Court's prestige and respect grew as a
result of this intervention."3 Justice Kennedy can learn from this history; but
perhaps more importantly, a new Justice could join Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan to form a majority that would be more willing to strike
down a redistricting plan as an unlawful partisan gerrymander. Ultimately,
Professor Fuentes-Rohwer's history lesson on the Court's initial foray into
redistricting disputes should prove particularly useful to a new Justice, who could
provide the crucial fifth vote to root out the worst partisan abuses in redistricting.
Three of the articles in this Issue provide commentary on the voter ID debate
and the Court's general approach to issues of race, class, and election
administration.
Professor Gilda Daniels laments the Court's decision in Shelby County, which
gutted the Section 5 preclearance mechanism of the VRA, and calls for "voting
realism" as a response: "the need for racially aware legislation that corrects for past
historical discrimination that continues to have contemporaneous effects on the
right to vote.""a A new Justice, reconsidering the reasoning in Shelby County that
"things have changed dramatically" for racial minorities,55 could construe more
favorably election legislation that considers explicitly the continuing racial barriers
to democratic participation. At a minimum, even if a Trump appointee will have
similar views to Justice Scalia on the VRA, he or she still will have to grapple with
Professor Daniels's analysis.
Professor Atiba Ellis's idea for reviving Section 5 by taking a "voter-friendly"
approach is also worthy of a new Justice's consideration.16 Professor Ellis, focusing
on the clash of race and class on voting rights, proposes "a modification in the way
we consider the right to vote generally through taking seriously, in a voter-friendly
way, the concept of disparate impact and forcing the collective to bear the burden
of effecting the core promise of the right to vote."57 One problematic aspect of the
Court's current election law doctrine is "the state-focused utilitarian balance
developed through the Crawford line of jurisprudence,"58 or what I have identified
previously as the Court's overly deferential review of a state's interests in its election
regulations.59 That is, when considering the constitutionality of a state election
administration rule, the Court has too readily agreed with a state's generalized
52 See Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 51, at 580-81.
3 Id. at 581.
5 See Gilda R. Daniels, Voting Realsm, 104 KY. LJ. 583, 586 (2016).
51 Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625 (2013).
6 See Atiba R. Ellis, Economic Precarity, Race, and Voting Structures, 104 KY. LJ. 607 (2016).
17 Id. at 611.
s Id. at 628.
9 See Douglas, supra note 12, at 553.
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justifications for a law, without probing more deeply.6° But that deference to state
election processes was largely the product of the conservative majority giving states
too much leeway to run their election systems without much judicial oversight, as
well as Justice Stevens's explication of the constitutional test in Crawford, the voter
ID case.6' A new Justice could recognize that states should not be able to satisfy the
state-interest prong of the constitutional test by using simple platitudes such as
"preserving election integrity." A new Justice instead could recognize the need for a
"voter-friendly" approach that takes into account the disparate impact of many
voting rules on racial minorities and lower-class citizens. In the process, our
election administration will become more inclusive, ultimately improving our
democracy.
Professor Mike Pitts, also entering the voter ID debate, suggests a "grand
election bargain" for courts that compares a strict voter ID law with a state's pre-
Election Day voter registration requirement: "a state's adoption of a strict photo
identification law, such as Indiana's photo identification law, would result in that
state's advance-registration requirement being declared unconstitutional by either
the federal or state judiciary."62 He hedges by noting that he is "perhaps too hopeful
that the judiciary will start taking a stand in relation to how our elections are
structured."63 Yet a new Justice, even one that Trump appoints, might look more
skeptically at voter ID requirements or lengthy pre-registration rules as politically
motivated and thus constitutionally improper. The ultimate point is that our
election laws should not be based on which side they will help or hurt at the ballot
box. If a new Justice agrees that partisanship infiltrates election rules too much,
then he or she could consider a "grand election bargain" that tells courts to strike
down advance-registration rules in the face of other so-called integrity-enhancing
measures such as voter ID laws.
Moving on to campaign finance, the story that Professor Mike Gilbert and his
student Emily Reeder tell in their article on McCutcheon v. FEC offers a warning
to a new Supreme Court Justice: question your underlying assumptions about how
campaign finance actually works before ruling." Professor Gilbert's and Ms.
Reeder's analysis undermines the Court's recent decision in McCutch eon, which
invalidated federal aggregate contribution limitations,6 5 by showing that both base
and aggregate contribution limits root out corruption in different ways. Their
ultimate point is that the Court must be more careful in its underlying assumptions
about the various effects of campaign finance regulations. Certainly a new Justice,
coming to these issues somewhat fresh (or at least without the constraints of
o See id. at 554.
61 See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 189-91 (2008).
62 See Michael J. Pitts, Judicial "Enforcement" of a Grand Election Bargain, 104 KY. LJ. 631, 632
(2016).63
1 Id. at 650.
Michael D. Gilbert & Emily Reeder, Aggregate Corruption, 104 KY. LJ. 651 (2016).
See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1442 (2014).
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binding precedent that stem from being on a lower court), could bring a new
perspective to the Court's consideration of campaign finance rules.
A fresh viewpoint also could help Professor Michael Solinine's argument that
the Court should not subject the products of direct democracy-ballot initiatives
and referenda-to strict scrutiny and instead should treat laws enacted in this
manner like ordinary legislation.6 6 Professor Solimine, in agreeing with Justice
Thomas's recent dissent in Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent
Redistricting Commission," argues that there is nothing particularly unique about
either the process or product of direct democracy that warrants heightened judicial
scrutiny. A new Justice could provide a different perspective on how to review laws
passed through this mechanism.
Finally, one article in this compilation lies completely outside of the judicial
realm: Professor Rebecca Green's idea to use arbitration as a way to resolve post-
election disputes about the winner. 68 Responding to Professor Ned Foley's new
book, Ballot Battles,69 which tells the history of disputed elections in America,
Professor Green posits that pre-election arbitration agreements for a disputed
election "could infuse greater fairness, predictability, and finality when election
outcomes are uncertain."7' Professor Green points out that the "potential of
embroiling the judiciary in political mire is arguably at its peak when election
outcomes are in dispute," as occurred in Bush v. Gore.7 Of course, the highly
partisan battle over a replacement for Justice Scalia demonstrates how the Supreme
Court has become, in many ways, an overly ideological institution. Thus, it is not
so much a new Justice him or herself, but the extremely political debate over who
will choose that person, that lends support to Professor Green's proposal to resolve
these extremely partisan disputes outside of the judiciary.
Ultimately, the seven articles in this Symposium Issue all have, at their core, the
same goal: improving our election system. Most of the articles respond to a
problem or concern about recent Supreme Court jurisprudence in this field. Justice
Scalia's sudden death, and thus a replacement on the Court, provides greater
opportunities for this scholarship to have a meaningful impact.
6 Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy A Reappraisal, 104 KY. LJ. 671
(2016).67 Ariz. State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm., 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2697-99 (2015)
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
" Rebecca Green, Arbitrating Ballot Battles?, 104 KY. LJ. 699 (2016).
69 
EDWARD B. FOLEY, BALLOT BATFLES: THE HISTORY OF DISPUTED ELECTIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES (2016).
70 Green, supra note 68, at 700.
71 Id.
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CONCLUSION
The articles in this Symposium Issue on election law will enter the pages of the
Kentucky Law Journal amidst a lot of uncertainty-particularly on the identity of
the next Supreme Court Justice and how that person will view election law
doctrine.
But there are two things we can say with certitude. First, Justice Scalia's death
created sudden instability in various areas of election law, with the potential of
altered doctrine for redistricting, the VRA, campaign finance, and election
administration. Second, legal scholars can impact this field in a meaningful way,
with a renewed hope that a new Justice will be more amenable to their arguments
than the Court has been in recent years. Reforming the Court's election law
jurisprudence could result in a better functioning democratic process; entrenching
or extending harmful precedents will impede that goal. The next Justice will play an
important role in resolving these issues. The Kentucky Law Journal Symposium
articles are at the forefront of that debate.
